



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 7

## Challenges of a Changing World

by John Kenneth Galbraith

The failure of our foreign policy is related to a deep and fundamental revolution in our domestic affairs which, for various reasons, we have sought to check and even reverse as it reached the water's edge. And we have managed to conceal the nature, though not the fact, of this failure even from ourselves. Circumstances have aided this. So have numerous of our experts on foreign policy who have played an assiduous and important role in cultivating our illusions. These illusions have invariably been consistent with short-run political convenience and economic comfort.

In the decades of the 30's and 40's, especially that of the 30's, a great and, indeed, revolutionary change occurred in our domestic political and economic life. Its nature is now well understood. Whereas the balance of political power had previously been centered, explicitly or implicitly, on the community of wealth and business success, it now shifted to farmers, urban workers and, more generally, to the less privileged and the less well-to-do. With this movement across the political spectrum came a large increase in public responsibility for social welfare and so-

cial well-being—the things that now pass under the cognomen of the welfare state—together with an altered distribution of income, a more influential role for unions and a more considerate attitude toward racial minorities. Where before the United States government had been identified, however imperfectly and erratically, with the interests of the classes, it now became identified, again however imperfectly and unevenly, with the interests of the masses.

This change, however identified and described, is now regarded as a fact of our history. It was not accomplished without bitterness. Revolutionary changes never are. Nor did it fail to excite hopes that it might be reversed and undone. All revolutions breed their counterrevolutionaries, and the latter have rarely avoided a predisposition to romantic or wishful thinking. One imagines that many who voted for President Eisenhower in 1952 did so in the hope, and even in the confident expectation, that the welfare state might be repealed and the New Deal and Fair Deal revolution might be undone. In retrospect we know there was never a chance. The loom of history weaves with a

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certain finality. The identification of the state with popular welfare was deeply accepted; any major adverse move would have been politically disastrous. People not only knew there had been a revolution, but they had every intention of defending it.

The years of this domestic revolution we have come also to regard as the golden age of American foreign policy. And this is no matter of mere nostalgia. In the 30's and 40's our moral standing in the world at large was at an all-time high. The president of the United States was a revered figure nearly the world around. The term "anti-American" had not even been invented. More important, since I suppose that this is the practical definition of leadership, if the United States in these years of its own revolution proposed something to other countries, there was an overwhelming predisposition to accept it. Perhaps problems were simpler—although the period we are talking about embraces World War II—and doubtless mistakes were made. But there can be no doubt that the 30's and the 40's were American years.

The ultimate reason for this success is clear. It was not the unique personality of Roosevelt, although that was not unimportant. It was not the unique wisdom of the Democratic party. Indeed, the eventual decline probably began under the Democrats. The reason for the success was that the foreign policy in these years mirrored the domestic revolution. Foreign policy also became identified with masses and not

classes. It came to reflect a concern for people in general, not a privileged few. In other words, foreign policy in these years kept pace, more or less, with domestic policy.

### Concern for People

And, as we look back on it, an astonishing number of steps in American foreign policy had their point of focus, not on the governments of other countries, but on the well-being of the people of other countries. This was evident in the earliest days of our domestic revolution—in the prompt encouragement that was given to the overthrow of Machado in Cuba, in the flat notice to the London economic conference that we placed recovery ahead of the official clichés of the financial oligarchies, and in the beginning of foreign loans for worthy, as distinct from profitable, purposes. However, the policy came closest to maturity in the war years with the full and nearly unprecedented acceptance of civilian well-being as a public responsibility in the countries of both friend and foe. UNRRA and the Marshall Plan carried forward this pattern. These stilled popular anxieties and served popular aspirations. Perhaps we should also remind ourselves that the American identification with peace and peaceful negotiation in these years was also an instinctive identification with popular goals. War and the talk of war has not in our time had a wide popular appeal.

But we must notice that this revolution in foreign policy was an ir-

regular and amorphous thing. It had none of the sharp lineaments of the domestic revolution. Being less clearly recognized and, what is more important, affecting no significant domestic interest, it had far, far fewer protectors than the domestic revolution. It was possible for this revolution to be reversed without the country being at all clear as to what had occurred. The repeal of the Social Security Act, by contrast, would have been visible to all, and most unpleasantly clear to those who undertook the task.

The retreat from the diplomacy of our own social revolution was, as I have noted, partly because we had failed to see that there had been a companion revolution in foreign policy. We did not see that our domestic policy and our foreign policy are cut from the same piece. But there were other causes. To a considerable extent the retrogression was a casualty of bipartisanship. Foreign policy was deemed to require the support of those who had either disliked or vigorously opposed the domestic revolution. So anything in foreign policy that smacked of the welfare goals and popular objectives of the domestic revolution had to be excised. Support for military aid had to be purchased from those who thought that economic aid, or for that matter economic democracy, was a dangerous invention of the New Deal. It was on one recent occasion deemed wise to entrust what economic aid was inescapable to a man who had shown his utter abhorrence of the domestic revolution.

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Others who disliked the domestic revolution did not hesitate to insist that it must be considered a purely domestic aberration. Nothing has ever worked so damagingly against the liberal who is concerned with foreign policy as the charge that he has Messianic ambitions—that his concern for social reform and social justice extends to the other countries. An American may be compassionate at home and survive. But abroad he must be a cold-visaged practitioner of *Realpolitik*.

Now for a word on what the reversal, more precisely the re-reversal, of this policy requires. Clearly we can no longer afford the notion that foreign policy is a dance—an intricate minuet—which some people, peculiarly endowed with skill, experience, or a penchant for fast footwork can do with unique proficiency. We must abandon the notion that politics and political attitudes stop at the water's edge, for, in fact, a decision to do so is a decision to do nothing of the kind. Rather it is a decision to carry beyond our borders the lowest denominator of political conservatism, for this happens to be the common denominator of political agreement on foreign affairs. Americans who accept and applaud the domestic revolution, now happily a considerable and no longer a partisan majority, must come to support like aspirations abroad. This they must do even though it incurs the profound displeasure of those who still see their country in the image of Chester A. Arthur. Debate here is not to be avoided but welcomed. It is far better to do the right thing as the result of debate than the wrong thing as a manifestation of national unity.

This does not mean a massive interference in the affairs of other countries—that this is implied will be the almost automatic riposte of

those who ally themselves automatically with the *status quo ante*. But it does mean that our position on political tyranny or economic exploitation must be equally clear, whether it is in the United States or Latin America. And, it might be added, nonintervention does not justify an evenhanded policy of distributing aid to tyrants.

### Human Betterment the Goal

On the positive side, the policy means an increased and reinvigorated use of those instruments of foreign policy which are intimately related to popular aspiration. Of these the most important, of course, is economic aid and support to economic development. This must not be subordinate to, or the handmaiden of, the trivia of day-to-day negotiation. It must be guided by men whose commitment to human betterment is unquestioned. And it must invite the similar support of our people. If our commitment is bogus and expedient, other countries will realize it quite as well as we. A policy that is based on popular aspirations goes well beyond pecuniary aid. Internal reform, the disestablishment of feudal institutions and privileged claims on income, is more often than we like to think a prerequisite for economic advance. Our sympathy for this must not be in question. And where we can usefully do so we must provide help and guidance. Convenience and above all the narrow economic interest of our own overseas enterprise must not stand in the way.

Finally, we must be sympathetic to idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of popular aspiration. We have enjoyed ours, and other countries are entitled to theirs. To nothing is Brazil, for example, more firmly committed by popular opinion than the determination to develop its oil resources under public auspices. One cannot be

sure that this is the most efficient course. But there could be no more dubious example of the archaic diplomacy than to tell the Brazilian government that our support is contingent upon exploitation of these resources by private enterprise. Had we interpreted Brazil's aspirations in terms of our own policies, which led to the development of the Tennessee River Valley—our resources and atomic energy are all under government auspices—we would scarcely have made such a mistake.

I do not have great hopes that those who are now committed to the archaic attitudes will suddenly see the light. One might be a little cautious in belief if this were to seem to be so. I would hope, however, that our foreign policy would soon become the subject of the same kind of social and political debate that focused the conflicting attitudes toward the New and Fair deals. Perhaps we can hope that it will be a trifle more mature and impassioned. But the alternative, as I have noted, is agreement on an ungenerous and arid conservatism. We will stand before the world as a rich country seeking only to protect our own. We will display understanding neither of our own revolution nor any other. We will have done more than any other country to show that popular aspirations can be realized here, but we shall show ourselves supremely indifferent to the hopes of others to realize theirs. I doubt that we will then have much influence in the world. Indeed, I would not suppose that we would deserve very much.

Excerpted from an address by John Kenneth Galbraith, professor of economics, Harvard University, and author of several books, the most recent of which is *The Affluent Society* (Houghton, 1958), at the 40th Anniversary Conference of the Foreign Policy Association, November 11, 1958. (This is being offered as the first of nine articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1959"—Reshaping Foreign Policy Amid Revolutions—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)





## Should U.S. Foreign Policy Be Changed?

by Joseph S. Clark

Excerpted from an address by Senator Joseph S. Clark, Democrat of Pennsylvania and former mayor of Philadelphia, at a luncheon discussion on "Congress and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy" sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel as part of its 40th Anniversary celebration on November 11.

**P**UBLIC opinion is eventually the controlling factor in the foreign policy of a democratic society. If, as Vice President Nixon said on more than one occasion during the recent election campaign, foreign policy was an issue—and I agree with him that it was—the people of this country are not satisfied with the *status quo* in our foreign policy either. They want a change.

The change that would, of course, make the most difference in our foreign policy is the replacement of our present Secretary of State. I believe this is a change which is needed. But it is one over which the Congress has no direct control.

This is not personal. Most people in both parties will agree that our Secretary of State is an intelligent, hard-working, dedicated public servant. But he has become, I submit, the symbol of the national discontent with our foreign policy, just as his predecessor did before him. This may be unfortunate, but it is a fact.

The Democratic Congress, I dare say, will not subject Mr. Dulles to the kind of rude treatment that was Mr. Acheson's unhappy, and in my view, undeserved, fate. But we would be failing in our duties, and in conscience, if we did not face up to the fact that it is going to be difficult indeed to put our policies on a new course with the present leadership in the State Department.

Let us consider the effect of the November 4 election on the role of Congress in foreign affairs. Changes in the composition of the Senate will, in my view, vastly improve that body's contribution to foreign policy. The 86th Congress will not number

among its members Senators Barrett, Bricker, Hoblitzell, Jenner, Knowland, Malone, Martin, Potter, Revercomb and Thye. Their successors, in almost all instances, will favor a more constructive foreign policy.

In the 86th Congress, by reason of the Democratic sweep, there will be either one or two additional Democrats and one or two fewer Republicans on each of the major committees. While there are a few Democratic isolationists from the South, the overwhelming majority of my party's Senators who are likely to fill the Committee vacancies thus created will be liberal internationalists.

I should also point out that the internationalist wing of the Republican party will receive strong support from the victories of Kenneth Keating in New York and Hugh Scott in Pennsylvania and Mr. Prouty in Vermont. Clifford Case, John Sherman, Cooper and Jack Javits will now have some allies to help them in their efforts to rationalize our foreign policy; and they will have much less opposition within their own ranks. What views the Republican side of the aisle may have toward the Secretary of State remain to be seen. What partisan opposition cannot accomplish, "friendly persuasion" can frequently achieve.

### Program for Congress

While the initiative in this area rests primarily with the Executive, I suggest that Congress may consider action along the following lines:

1. Increased appropriations to raise the living standards of the Palestinian Arab refugees beyond the

mere subsistence level and to promote their resettlement.

2. Re-examination of our present low immigration quotas for Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

3. Exploration of the feasibility of an arms embargo for the entire area to be enforced by the United Nations.

4. Channeling economic aid to specific projects rather than political regimes.

5. Investigation of the adequacy of our area intelligence which seemed so deficient at the time of the Iraq revolution.

6. Financial backing to establish a pro-Western Arab radio station in the Middle East to counter the "Voice of the Arabs" from Cairo.

7. Consideration of repeal of the so-called "Eisenhower Doctrine," which we passed in Congress at the President's urgent request. This doctrine has embarrassed our friends in the region and totally missed the main nationalistic trend of thought in the area. It is not now subscribed to by any state and has not been invoked at any time, even in the Lebanese affair. It has been a cloud to clear thinking.

I would be less than candid if I did not express to you my own misgivings about the position of the United States during the next two years. Our Federal framework of government has put us in an unfortunate position. We must continue until new leadership in the White House is forthcoming to bump along as best we can, developing and advocating new ideas and new policies; voting legislation and appropriations,

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by Jacob K. Javits

Excerpted from an address by Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, former Representative and attorney general of New York, made at the same luncheon discussion.

I FIND myself between Scylla and Charybdis. I could say, "Well, Joe, I agree with you thoroughly. You know I vote that way, so what are we arguing about?" Or I could be a staunch member of my party and go off in its defense. And there is quite a defense. Don't kid yourself about that. I'll give you a few indications of it.

But I shall succumb to neither, for I believe that the destiny of bipartisan foreign policy is going to have to be in your hands and mine. And for today, with all deference, I think it's in my hands. I hope tomorrow it will be in our joint hands. And I'm not going to jeopardize it. There's just too much to be done. And I'll give you a practical example of that.

You just can't carry these things unless you have the great policy which was offered by Senator Vandenberg and Senator George. You just can't do it. You can't get by. There are just too many dug in on both sides. And if it isn't in the direct issues of foreign policy, it's in the peripheral issues—like the civil rights issue—which are just as vital.

### **Bipartisanship Needed**

And so I believe that a very great solicitude must be exercised, not for what the Democrats can do, or for what the Republicans can't do, but for what we can both do.

And now, a word about Dulles and Eisenhower because, as I said, I should try to steer a fair middle ground between these two possibilities. Dulles is Eisenhower's man, and Eisenhower must be held responsible for anything Dulles does; and therefore, in my opinion, the President is

entitled to anyone he thinks can carry out the foreign policy of the United States the best. And I think our condemnation, therefore, if it's deserved, must be of the President. His particular agent for the purpose is his sole responsibility, in my opinion, provided he's a moral human being and is not a discredit to the country. I think that was true of Acheson; I think it's just as true of Dulles.

Are we going to begin to make comparisons between the loss of China, which wasn't the Democrats' fault, and the loss of Iraq, which I don't think was particularly the Administration's fault? Of course, not. It will never get us anywhere.

### **Eisenhower's Achievements**

But I do think this is fair. We put Eisenhower there for certain purposes, and I think on the whole he performed. For example, the Korean war I believed in, just as Joe Clark believed in it; but it had to be brought to a conclusion, and we had to put in a new team for that purpose. It just got beyond management. Whether it was right or wrong or whether the consequences of it were fair or unfair, it had to be brought to some kind of a conclusion. And so Eisenhower was a sort of drop kicker for that purpose.

Eisenhower also, with all of his weak points, offered the atoms-for-peace plan, which is one of the great developments in American foreign policy; he offered the open-skies proposal; he had the courage to suggest with deep sincerity and, I think, intelligent conditions, the cessation of nuclear testing; he did get an exten-

sion of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements plan for four years, and it's a pretty good bill; he did have a lot to do with the success of Euratom, a contract for which we just concluded the other day. In short, the whole record is not negative—much as I find wanting in it, too, in terms of initiative and of driving forward.

And then also we must remember that, although there are many weak spots in the world—and Lord knows there are, and very difficult ones—we have got some pretty strong spots. For one, the situation on the borders between East and West Germany, considered a very sensitive point and one in which we were, in which we might have taken a terrible licking, seems now to be secure with Chancellor Adenauer and people who agree with Adenauer rather firmly in the saddle.

For another, India, where the tide was considered to be running against us very strongly, now shows very many more signs of sure-footedness and strength. Vietnam, which is a very important foothold in South Asia, seems to be holding its own very well and to have been considerably brought back by President Diem, whom we were very heavily responsible in supporting where he is. And so on.

Or look at Yugoslavia, the most important dissident in the Communist bloc, where our aid has been forthcoming and fortified, emboldening others to equal dissidence.

Even in the Middle East, about which I know a good deal from work and application, do we hear too much about the fact that today relations with Israel, our strongest and firmest ally in that area, are better than they ever were before; and I understand that the Israeli leaders have themselves said so, quite publicly. Now this doesn't reflect, therefore, a completely disastrous, adverse turn to us in that area, with all its difficulties.

I have made these references only in order to get a little sense of balance in this, because if the Congress is going to be effective—and I think the Congress can be tremendously effective—it can only be effective if we don't think that things are just all black on one side and all white on the other. We must have some sense of proportion and some sense of balance.

There's going to be a lot of new thinking, and I think the next two years is an excellent time to do it, even in political terms. Because we are pretty much going out of an era, in terms of the Eisenhower Administration, and going into some new concept, with lots of people bidding for the presidency. This kind of competition is very good for new ideas and for new initiatives in the Congress. And so there'll be a lot of new thinking in these next couple of years about very fundamental problems: first, in the orthodox way, of increasing private and public investment; and, second, perhaps in unorthodox ways, of tremendous cooperation for the purpose of enlisting private public funds in the development of the world—and ideas like that of Senator Monroney for the use of massive amounts of soft currency in world economic development. Perhaps also we should discuss other ideas like those in the United Nations about the much abused and probably invalid SUNFED, although SUNFED has the fundamental concept which the world will ultimately have to follow of the use of massive resources for the purpose of economic reconstruction.

And so I believe that we ought to dedicate ourselves to the proposition that in the next two years we will be more active than ever; that we will explore every avenue and every new idea that is available to us to drive forward the fundamental mission of peace leadership of the United States.

## Clark

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probably inadequate in amount, for purposes dimly understood, if at all; hoping against hope that disaster will not strike us until conditions beyond the immediate control of either the Congress or the people of the United States are remedied.

Meanwhile, we will hope to curtail our brinkmanship abroad while, at the same time, offering a friendly hand to the uncommitted countries in the world and a less belligerent, but nonetheless firm, opposition to the expansionist aims of the Communist bloc.

### Disarmament and World Law

Finally a word about the two most important objectives of our foreign policy concerning which so much is said and so little done: First, nuclear and conventional disarmament; second, a revision of the Charter of the UN in an effort to achieve world peace through world law.

We agitate ourselves and the rest of the world over the fate of a rocky little island in the mouth of Amoy harbor, but how much of our real brain power, and how much of our national heart and soul are we putting into a serious effort to achieve disarmament? How many hours in the last 12 months have the President, the Secretary of State and his principal advisers put into an earnest

search for ways and means of achieving a safe and workable agreement with communism in this area? How much attention has the State Department given to the hearings of Senator Humphrey's Subcommittee on Disarmament? Is anybody in the State Department or the White House thinking hard on the steps which must be taken in the foreseeable future to revitalize the UN and bring about world peace through world law if we are not all to be blown to smithereens?

Or are all these matters considered merely the foolish dreams of impractical idealists?

The 86th Congress, I hope, will explore these questions.

The Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson of Texas, has called for "bold, new, imaginative programs" in the field of foreign affairs. Such programs are, in my judgment, quite literally essential to survival. I hope they will receive the serious attention they deserve at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

The greatest contribution the Congress could make to our foreign policy in the next two years would be to mobilize American public opinion in support of serious negotiations, looking toward a practical solution to the nuclear stalemate and absence of international law and order, which today holds all rational minds in the grip of fear.

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## U.S. and Russia's Economic Challenge

Russia's economic challenge, discussed in the December 1 *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN*, was further underscored on November 12, when Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev told the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist party that his government planned to increase the gross industrial production of the U.S.S.R. by 80 percent in the next seven years.

What can the United States, and other Western nations, do to meet this challenge? As has proved true of the challenge of Communist ideology, the remedy for the Soviet economic drive is not the use of force, or attempts to suppress the industrial growth or the aid and trade activities of the Communist nations. What is urgently needed, according to many thoughtful observers in the United States and Europe, is to review, reorganize and coordinate the aid and trade programs of the non-Communist countries with a view to strengthening not only their own economies, but also those of the underdeveloped areas from which they draw many essential raw materials and where they hope, in the future, to find markets for manufactured goods.

### President's Seattle Speech

The current and prospective plans of the United States were summed up by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his November 10 address to the Colombo Plan conference in Seattle. The President tried to reassure his listeners, who had wondered whether Republican election campaign attacks on "left-wing spenders" portended foreign-aid cuts. While he said that this "country's outlays must never outrun the

levels justified by the continuing growth in our economic strength if it is to sustain the long-term effort that is required," he added: "Fortunately, the United States economy is forging ahead rapidly, as it emerges from a brief period of readjustment," and said that "its expanding resources should permit a vigorous prosecution of the program for progress," which he outlined.

This program includes five major requirements for economic growth:

1. *Expanded international trade.* The President pointed out that "the larger part of the capital goods required for economic development must, of course, be financed through international trade." He called on all the Colombo Plan countries to cooperate in assuring the expansion of trade and in relaxing trade restrictions.

The 1958 renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act for four years should further this objective. If, however, the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America—the chief targets of the Soviet trade-and-aid drive—are to be reassured about their trade prospects, more specific information will have to be available about increased marketing opportunities in the United States, Canada and Western Europe. At the present time even an advanced non-Western nation, Japan, is finding it hard to expand its exports substantially, and the underdeveloped countries are concerned about the tariffs on agricultural products which may be imposed by the Common Market group of six Western European nations.

President Eisenhower did give hope to the underdeveloped nations, most of which rely entirely or in

large part on the export of primary commodities, that the United States, which in the past has opposed international commodity agreements, is prepared to join in a discussion "of such problems to see whether a solution can be found."

2. *Technical skills.* The President stressed the need of the underdeveloped countries to achieve satisfactory levels of skills in professions and trades if they are to advance their economic development. He discussed both expansion of the United States technical assistance program through the International Cooperation Administration and the work of the United Nations, to whose Special Projects Fund this country has made a contribution.

Some experts here believe that it would be advisable for the United States to encourage UN technical assistance on a larger scale than it does today, on the ground that non-American technicians are more readily available and can be obtained at lower scales of salaries and maintenance costs than Americans. It is also argued that many of them are more familiar with the needs of underdeveloped lands than Americans, accustomed to working in a highly industrialized economy.

3. *Private investment.* The President urged an increase in private investment, citing the experience of the United States in this respect, and saying that "we have seen it work. We know what it can do."

Some American experts, while agreeing that increased private investment would be desirable, contend that the conditions of underdeveloped countries today cannot be compared with those of the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries.



Private investors, they point out, legitimately expect to obtain profits from their investments, and for this purpose seek a "favorable climate" of political stability and economic prosperity which is seldom found in non-Western lands. In the absence of such a climate American investors seek government aid and protection which, it is pointed out, often contradict the term "private initiative."

4. *Normal bankable loans.* The President called attention to the decisions taken at the October meeting of the World Bank's board of governors in New Delhi. There it was agreed that the executive directors of the bank would promptly consider an increase in its capital subscriptions to obtain greater funds in the private market without any new payments by the bank's members; and to increase the quotas in the International Monetary Fund. The Export-Import Bank, the president mentioned, also extends bankable loans.

5. *Development financing which would afford the borrower flexibility regarding terms of repayment.* The President gave strong support to the Development Loan Fund established by the United States in 1957, under which loans can be repaid in the currency of the borrowing country, not only in dollars, and expressed the hope that Congress, which in 1958 cut the requested appropriation for the fund, would pro-

vide adequate resources for it "from time to time." He also suggested the possibility of creating an international development association for this purpose as an affiliate of the World Bank.

These five main points indicate the road the United States and, it hopes, the other advanced industrial nations of the West as well as Japan will travel in the years ahead. The crucial question is whether all the investment and development measures already taken or about to be adopted will provide adequate capital for the development of countries, many of whom are faced with the tragic need of sharing available resources among populations which, because of improved health and hygiene conditions, are increasing in geometric proportion.

It would be helpful if Western economists offered at least a rough estimate of the anticipated cost, which could serve as a target for the non-Communist world's endeavors to meet the Soviet economic challenge. That this cost may prove far greater than is generally admitted—perhaps in the magnitude of \$3 billion annually for 50 years—is indicated by French estimates that the proposed development of Algeria alone, with a population of 9 million, would require \$1 billion.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of two articles)

## FPA Bookshelf

### WORLD AFFAIRS BOOKS FOR CHRISTMAS GIVING

*Doctor Zhivago*, by Boris Pasternak (New York, Pantheon, \$5.00). This *cause célèbre* book by a distinguished translator of Shakespeare and Goethe is in the tradition of the Russian novel, spacious and full of sentiment, presenting a broad cross-section of human beings before and after the Communist revolution. The author, born in 1890, studied philosophy in Germany, and his thinking is deeply affected by liberal ideas and belief in individualism. He admits that he is not interested in politics, but pleads eloquently for nongregariousness and for freedom to think. He denounces Marxism, revolutionary leaders, collectivization, and other features of the Soviet system, and extols Christianity, but he also makes clear the conditions which brought about communism. At the same time he expresses deep affection for Russia, and voices hope for its future.

*The Ugly American*, by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick. (New York, Norton, 1958, \$3.75). A collection of short stories, vivid, dramatic and angry, about Americans in Southeast Asia, illustrating the reasons why communism is capturing the minds and hearts of uncommitted peoples. The authors present their arguments as fiction, but claim to base their account on fact. This is a disturbing book which should be read by everyone interested in case studies of the stupidity and ignorance, the heroism and generosity, of American diplomatic, technical and military personnel abroad. Extremely readable, the tales will remain to haunt the conscience of thoughtful readers.

*The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein*, K.S. (Cleveland and New York, World, 1958, \$6.00). These memoirs, written by hand and heavily documented, reveal a courageous, self-willed, dedicated military leader who had little patience with the views of those who did not agree with him, whether it was Eisenhower or Churchill. The book as a whole will be useful to military experts. The layman will be particularly interested in Montgomery's estimates of American leaders, particularly Eisenhower.

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